by Daniel Haggard

Created on: November 07, 2006   Last Updated: May 08, 2007

There is much temptation when considering the notion of Grammar in Wittgenstein to give it greater significance of place in his thought than it really deserves. Since he characterises his investigations as grammatical' we are tempted to think that the notion of grammar is what is essential to his investigations as a whole. But when we look carefully at the notion, and the kind of work that Wittgenstein is doing in his investigations, we come to realise that this is a mistake. To see some kind of essentialist tendency in Wittgenstein is to do the opposite of what he prescribes. In this essay I will look at the approaches of two authors, show how they make this mistake and show how we may avoid it through a careful examination of Wittgenstein's use of the term, and the nature of his investigations.

There is considerable disagreement in the literature concerning Wittgenstein's use of the term grammar', particularly the difference, if any, between his use and the more traditional kind. P.M.S. Hacker concludes in his discussion that Wittgenstein is not stretching the concept of grammar, nor introducing a new concept in its place. Martin Oneil agrees that a distinction is not being made, but asserts that the concept is being stretched because: The philosopher is interested in all of the constitutive rules of language, the grammarian only in a narrow class of them.' G.E.M. Anscombe, although adamant when he asserts that: It is thus not the case at all that Wittgenstein means anything but "grammatical" when he says "grammatical", remains uncertain about Wittgenstein's claim that a vast number of philosophical and metaphysical statements are disguised statements of grammar'. He goes on to say that: each such claim has to be examined separately, and when he (Wittgenstein) says that something, "like everything metaphysical", is rooted in the grammar of our language, it is difficult to form a judgement on the general claim' Thus he seems to abstain from the question of whether Wittgenstein is including in his concept of grammar that which is not ordinarily included.

None of these authors provide particularly compelling reasons for these conclusions, nor do they spend any time discussing why the comparison is fruitful. Most of the impetus seems to come from the apparent discrepancy between Wittgenstein's claim that he was not using the word in a technical or new way, and the use to which it was put. But of this apparent discrepancy, very little is said. Hacker says:

Wittgenstein

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