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no response of any kind from the administration.

Changes in the UN leadership began to play a role in the slow shift of the officially recognized policy in Somalia. The limited objectives that were originally in place began to become much broader (Halberstam 254) due to the entrance of the new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a supporter of Siad Barre who held a personal hatred for Aidid and was intently interested in "changing the political character of Somalia and ending Aidid's power" (Halberstam 255). However, Boutros-Ghali would need the help of a disinterested Clinton administration in order to meet his personal goals, which were now the official goals of the UN.

The goal of the UN had now gone from providing humanitarian support to disarming the Somalis. Characteristic of the Clinton administration, no one would take a stand in outlining or clarifying the administration's policy. In, fact when Madeleine Albright virtually echoed Boutros-Ghali in a speech before the UN, it became readily apparent that the administration "was not taking events is Somalia seriously enough, and that no one was really in charge" (Halberstam 257). Then, on June 5, 1993, Aidid had his forces attack and kill the Pakistani soldiers. In the view of Bob Oakley, a former American ambassador to Somalia, what was coming was "nation-building at gunpoint" (Halberstam 258).

By this point, hunger and disease were no longer the enemy in Somalia. They had been replaced by Aidid. A UN arrest warrant had been issued in addition to a $25,000 bounty being placed on Aidid.

Making matters worse for the administration was the fact that UN Ambassador Albright was publicly stating "policy" in the opinion pages of the New York Times. In an August 1993 piece, Albright stated. "Failure to take action [against Aidid] would have signaled to other clan leaders that the UN is not serious." (Halberstam 258). The problem with this statement was that no one in the administration seemed to really be in charge. By September, however, Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Boutros-Ghali and suggested trying to find a diplomatic solution to the problems in Somalia. Boutros-Ghali was not accepting of this suggestion.

The entire situation came to a tragic head for the Clinton administration when, on October 3, 1993, an operation was put into action in an attempt to capture Aidid and his closest aides. It seems that both the US and the UN had severely underestimated the will to fight resting

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