by George Mulligan

Created on: October 01, 2009   Last Updated: October 05, 2009

I oppose staying the course in Afghanistan or anywhere else within American foreign or domestic policy, in part because there is no defined course, in part because there are no definable means for average Americans to verify causal relationships or alternatives, and in part because all foreign and domestic policy are evolving, dialectical, multifaceted, and outdated.

Is the American objective strictly to protect the United States from being attacked by Al Qaeda personnel based in Afghanistan?

What if the people capable of attacking America are in Pakistan or any other company? Or, more importantly, what if Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan lack logistical capability, resources, and motivation to be anything other than local nuisances?

What if Al Qaeda is a puppet organization to create justification for actions and expenditures which are related to galvanize public opinion and to redirect American and foreign resources for financial, political, and other reasons?

(If the Federalist Papers and History could be considered as resources, would any reasonable person deny pretext and deceitful activities by decision makers as possibilities?)

There are evolving situations in the United States and in Afghanistan. America has national, state, and local political elections, causing changes in appointed, promoted, and assigned personnel; who make decisions related to, and affecting the economy, and every part of America. There are a series of new developments, new knowledge about past developments, and pressures for changes of course.

There becomes a dialectical series of decisions and events, which by definition, contributes to new dialectics, which by definition, contributes to new dialectics.

To write there are multifaceted factors involved in American foreign or domestic policy is an under statement, which becomes self evident, simply reviewing Congressional and Administrative process.

Outdated factors and outdated American foreign or domestic policy is a fact of human nature. Senior personnel have ingrained and indoctrinated habits, with cascading or reinforcing systemic and personal precedents. These are based on series of information and decisions predicated on political influences rather than enlightened self interests, or even simple truths. The Military and Intelligence Communities have their own agendas while dealing with political, business and adversaries.

Just as the Military tries to anticipate fighting future wars, Administrative and Legislative branches and subsidiaries use advanced supercomputers to war game any and every eventuality with computers which are generations more powerful and capable than available to the public.

An example is the play station for video games are far more powerful than rooms full of computers used for America to go to the moon in 1969. Have computers changed much in 40 years?

Would any reader unequivocally any honestly write, that our course in Afghanistan is a complete success? Perhaps?

Yet, years ago I read: when everything has been said and done, there will still be more to say and do. I believe the cute wisecrack, reinforces a flawed concept of always staying a course.

So, in summary, I suspect everyone can find some fault somewhere or another, with our course in Afghanistan or any where else for that matter. If that's true, how could anyone postulate staying the course is logical or desirable?

Perhaps Afghanistan's course, like some golf games, needs a Mulligan?

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