by Ben Evans

Created on: February 10, 2007   Last Updated: April 19, 2007

Much has been written lately on the so called 'answer' for Iraq. Many proposals are well thought through and I, unlike many others, believe that western opinion is substantially better informed about the nature of the Iraq crisis than it was before the US - led invasion in 2003. What almost all proposals fail to do at the moment however, is accord to the so - called Iraqi National government the agency it requires to attempt to resolve the problems it faces.

Currently, all attention is focused upon the United States, and its plans for Iraq - withdrawal, division of the country, requesting help from Syria and Iran, requesting help from the UN, troop 'surge' etc etc. That this problem is the focus of so much attention is laudable, but unfortunately all these proposals are fundamentally flawed in a very serious respect.

Firstly, they are all framed in terms of the US saving face - they are constructed, and argued for, in terms of US interest. Therefore, they will do nothing to assuage either the deeply held distrust and resentment that much of the muslim world holds towards America and its motives, nor will they endear America to the allies (much as the Bush administration is loathe to admit) it needs in order to prosecute the war on terror. Even the bi - partisan Baker plan was framed entirely in terms of Americas interests - no mention was made of its chief ally in this venture, Britain, which has receieved shamefully little recognition for its almost unstinting loyalty (which I shall address in another article).

Secondly, and more importantly, these proposals deny the (supposedly) soveriegn Iraqi government the agency it requires to ultimately take control of the country. That currently this government lacks the necessary monopoly of violence that all states must hold within their own borders is doubted by no one. But it seems that there is now a general assumption that it is incapable of attaining this monopoly as well. This is a fatal assumption, for it dooms a united Iraq to either permanent occupation or constant, internicine conflict. As loath as it is to admit it, we must recognise that Iraqs internal divisions were held in check by force of oppression alone by Saddam Hussein, and whilst the indiscriminate brutality of his regime still haunts Iraq, strong central government, backed up by credible displays of force, must be what the people of Iraq think of when they think of their government.

Laughable, many people would argue, given the impotency of the Iraqi

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