When scholars consider the Second Intermediate Period (SIP) in Egyptian history, they usually conclude that it was a time of turmoil and rapid change. Anthony Spalinger, for example, writes that the SIP is commonly seen as a "dark age" of political instability. For sure, the period 1782-1570 BC was marked by a high turnover rate in kings, with few rulers exercising dominance over Egypt as had been the case during the Middle Kingdom. But other more interesting factors were at work, apart from power struggles between provincial lords.
Most notable was the influx of Asiatic peoples known as the Hyksos. It is commonly believed that these ethnically distinct nomads, using their superior technology and organization, were able to take control of much of lower and middle Egypt. What we know of the Egyptians suggests they were often xenophobic, so the presence of the Hyksos Empire, which stretched from 'the Euphrates to the first cataract of the Nile', is bound to have been viewed with hostility. The general sentiment appears to have been favourable for an uprising. Indeed that is precisely what occurred under local rulers Seqenenre, Kamose and Ahmose I (and particularly the latter), who across the span of decades managed to drive the Hyksos from power, and then conducted campaigns against the Nubians.
What was the impact of the Hyksos on Egyptian society and state? In this essay, I suggest that two aspects of the Hyksos legacy are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, there is their introduction of Syro-Palestinian weaponry, and especially the chariot and composite bow. Secondly, it is fascinating to observe how the expulsion of these "rulers of foreign lands" by the Seventeenth Dynasty set in motion a process that contributed to the militarization of ancient Egypt. Arguably, the strength of the Egyptian empire during the New Kingdom was due in part to this aforementioned experience.
THE IMPACT OF THE HYKSOS
During the Old Kingdom, the militaristic element in society was not as powerful as the civil bureaucracy and priesthood. As Ian Shaw points out, there was no permanent standing army, and conscription was on an ad hoc basis. Far from being centralized in the hands of a few elites, control over the military increasingly devolved to local governors, a tendency that became obvious during the unrest of the First Intermediate Period. Although the Middle Kingdom saw "a more ambitious and systematic" approach to military organization with the rise of a semi-professional army engaged in complex campaigns in Nubia (under Sesostris III), it is during the New Kingdom that we find the ascension of an imperialistic Egypt holding vast foreign territory. The great warrior pharaohs between the 18th and 20th Dynasties such as Ramesses are prominent in this period.
The Hyksos period should be seen as the crucial bridge between the Middle Kingdom and the New Kingdom. This link is visible in two respects: weaponry, and the rise of a garrison state and a culture of nationalism.
War and Weaponry
"The Hyksos Period has traditionally been considered to be the time when a massive alteration of military technology came to pass in the Nile Valley" (Anthony Spalinger)
For centuries prior to the New Kingdom, the navy had played a major role in warfare. Evidence of this is found in the second Kamose stela, where Kamose stresses his capture of the Hyksos king Apophis' fleet outside Avaris. Ships, which formed "the foundation" of Middle Kingdom warfare, were primarily used to move soldiers quickly to the battlefield whereupon they would engage in hand-to-hand or long-range combat and siege warfare. The ranks of the navy were attractive to royal elites, whereas the army was seen as inferior. In the Eighteenth dynasty however a new form of weaponry became an important part of the Egyptian arsenal: the horse and chariot. The chariot usurped some of the transportation role previously performed by ships travelling along the Nile. Provided that the ground was flat, the chariot was highly mobile and could efficiently move troops to where they were required.
The importance of this development must be emphasised. The chariot, which was probably introduced by the Hyksos or another source from Western Asia (its exact origins remain a controversial point), enabled the formation of a strong land-based unit that would help the New Kingdom Egyptians render their conquest of Palestine and Syria more permanent.
Of course, the chariot had its weaknesses, as Alan Schulman has astutely observed. In the first place, Schulman points out that the chariot was not suitable for use as an offensive weapon owing to its lack of armour and the difficulty of keeping horses under control while charging head-on. At best, a driver and archer could provide covering fire from the flanks to enable infantry to close in on the opposition, or give chase once the enemy was already retreating. Chariots were useless in sieges. They were also extremely expensive to maintain. The costs of providing for a chariotry division meant that even at the height of the Egyptian empire, the ratio of chariots to infantrymen was only 1:100. As Brier and Hobbs write, "When an army marched out with its chariot corps, it displayed the kind of significant military investment only a superpower of the time could afford". Thus, it is doubtful that the relatively impoverished Theban dynasty that revolted against the Hyksos found the chariot very useful. In any case, the terrain of the Nile Valley all but eliminated the possibility of its use.
Nevertheless, this did not rule out the utility of the chariot in future New Kingdom campaigns. When combined with the composite bow, an innovation introduced by the Hyksos, the chariot could provide an effective means for archers to cover greater distance and focus upon urgent locations on the battlefield. The composite bow was different from the regular bow in that it was made from a variety of flexible woods, with the result that arrows fired using such a bow were able to pierce simple armour. Other items introduced by the Hyksos were the scimitar sword and full body armour. These were used to lessen vulnerabilities that had been exposed by the Hyksos.
One explanation for the comparative backwardness of the Egyptians in relation to weaponry has to do with a lack of historical experience with incessant warfare. As Spalinger notes: "Unlike the situation to the northeast in Asia where city-states vied for control over small patches of land, Egypt was at peace. Therefore, the nature of warfare in Egypt tended to be conservative, and the demand for new technology limited. The virtual monopoly of the Nile waterway, a perfect conduit for trade and political control, effected a stasis in Egypt with respect to the art of war."
We can see that the complacency of the Egyptians in adopting new weaponry was ameliorated to some extent by the reign of the Hyksos. With the arrival of the "vile" Asiatics came different ideas, and ultimately this would prove invaluable in strengthening Egypt in future campaigns. The chariotry, for instance, formed a key division of the New Kingdom military ever after, with nobles now preferring it over the royal navy. Admittedly, the chariot was partly for purposes of royal propaganda, but it also served a functional tactical role.
The Garrison State
"It is readily agreed that the aggressive policy of royal imperialism fostered by a strong nationalistic feeling owing to the wars against the Hyksos was an important propellant in the rise of the military" (Anthony Spalinger)
In contrast to some of the material uncovered from Dynasties XIII to XV, historical reliefs, stelas and texts after the expulsion of the Hyksos are almost universally critical of their behaviour. Whereas prior archaeological finds suggest that the Hyksos did respect Egyptian culture and beliefs, and even adopted the Egyptian system of administration, post-Sixteenth Dynasty rulers appear to propagandize the ignoble elements of these foreign rulers, perhaps hoping to fan the flames of nationalism and thereby legitimize their kingship. Manetho's description is typical. He denounces the "invaders of obscure race" who "overpowered the rulers of the land" and "burned our cities ruthlessly, razed to the ground the temples of the gods, and treated all the natives with a cruel hostility".
But xenophobic sentiment against the Hyksos is problematic because at the time of the Hyksos dynasty, these so-called foreign rulers and their ancestors had been living in Egypt for 100 years. Having resided in Egypt for so long, they were essentially locals, and even their burial practices did not display marked differences. Yet "the foreignness of the Hyksos was evidently something which left a deep impression on some Egyptians". Accordingly, the Turin king-list distinguished the Hyksos dynasty by writing their names with a cartouche and by adding a special hieroglyphic that designated them as foreign rulers. Such nationalism served to reinforce the prevailing state ideology in the push to expel the Hyksos, and then subsequently, to maintain Phaoronic rule. This is made clear by the fact that there were pockets of Egyptians loyal to the Hyksos. They preferred paying tribute to the Hyksos rather than the Egyptian Pharaohs.
The impact of individual kings during the Hyksos period was far-reaching too. Ideological beliefs that first were practiced in the reign of Kamose during the SIP later manifested itself in the New Kingdom. For example, the second Kamose stela couples the god Amun with the Pharaoh, a practice that would later become a facet of the Egyptian nation. As Spalinger comments, "There was a growing symbiotic relationship between king and deity, which naturally was broadcast through the official theological dogma of the day".
It is a truism that wars lead to growth in government power, and the dynamics of the SIP do not disprove this finding. Nationalism helped buttress the increase in the size and scope of government that had been brought about during the mass mobilization for the war against the Hyksos. The Hyksos period saw the birth of a powerful Egyptian military. As Breasted explains, "[The Hyksos] brought the horse into the Nile valley and taught the Egyptians warfare on a large scale". Once Ahmose had taken Avaris and pushed the Hyksos out of Lower Egypt, the temptation to use this newfound power was too great. "From this time on, the Egyptian kings moved southward [towards Nubia] in a concerted and well-planned manner". In the wake of the bigger army came "administrators, tax masters, accompanying civilians, and even the priesthood".
Or, as Faulkner puts it: "The rise of the Eighteenth Dynasty brought with it changes in the military sphere which amounted almost to a revolution. During the earlier periods of Egyptian history there was no lack of warlike activity, but it was on a comparatively small scale; under the new dispensation we meet for the first time with a large standing army organized on a national basis and officered throughout with professional soldiers. The reason for this fresh development was that, as a result of the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt and the determination of the Pharaohs to render impossible any repetition of the foreign domination, Egypt developed into a first-class military power with the control of Palestine and Syria as the main feature of her foreign policy".
The actual organisation of the military also reflects the deep-seeded ideological and political changes inspired by the Hyksos. There arose a full-fledged professional standing army. The full titulature and ranks were reinstated. The age for conscription was lowered, with stiff penalties for evasion. There were garrisons at key cities displaying the true might of the pharaoh. As Shaw observes, "The New Kingdom fortresses and garrisons of the Delta borders were intended to prevent any recurrence of the ignominious imposition of foreign rule by the Hyksos dynasty". The function of the military was now solely to police external threats - no longer did it also fulfill the role of quashing domestic disputes. There was hardly any time to do both. A "new scope to the functions of the Pharaoh had become firmly entrenched". There was now need for two Viziers rather than one, because the Pharaoh the head of the military was frequently required to travel throughout the land waging campaigns.
CONCLUSION
This essay has explored two seemingly distinct aspects of the lingering legacy of the Hyksos. In reality, both are interconnected. Without the improvements in weaponry inspired (or at least accelerated) by the Hyksos, subsequent Egyptian rulers are unlikely to have been able to carry out their imperialistic ambitions. At the end of the SIP, the sons of pharaohs became generals, not clerks; the rise of the military state had never before reached such dizzying heights. This is the legacy of the Hyksos.
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