by Christopher Rodgers

Created on: January 22, 2009   Last Updated: June 18, 2011

Those who defend the draft's morality are quick to point to the provision for conscientious objectors. Following is a section of an essay I wrote for a political ideologies class. This section examines the Selective Service's stance toward COs, namely the fact that individuals may be denied CO status in certain cases even if they do have valid moral objections to serving.

The area of the draft in which there is perhaps the most controversy is the question of conscientious objectors. A person who qualifies as a conscientious objector, someone who objects to war, can be exempted from military service in a draft. However, this exemption is denied to individuals who object to specific wars rather than war in general.

People who fall within this latter group are termed selective conscientious objectors. The current U.S. policy with regard to selective conscientious objectors is governed by the Supreme Court decision in Gillette v. United States. The petitioners in this case charged that the Military Selective Service Act violated the Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion clauses of the First Amendment, by being biased toward granting members of certain religions CO status, while denying said status to others. The Court rejected the petitioners' claims on the grounds that the Selective Service Act does not intentionally discriminate among religions, and any sections of the act which may lead to bias toward certain religions are included in the act for "valid, neutral reasons" (Ruesga 1995, 63-64).

A great deal of controversy surrounds the criteria that must be met for someone to be exempt from military service as a conscientious objector in the case of a draft. Any individual who applies for CO status must be evaluated, with the goal of deciding whether he is a "sincere objector" or a "slacker" (Stewart-Winter 2007, 520). The requirements for a person to be considered a sincere objector are not all that clear, as obviously legislation cannot address every possible reason for objecting to service, and even the stated requirements have changed over time. For instance, the U.S. did not recognize objections to war that were not grounded in religion until 1965 (Stewart-Winter 2007, 524).

Many individuals object to the government's ability to deny CO status to individuals whose reasons for objecting to military service don't meet certain criteria. In Ruesga's case, part of the reason for his opposition to discrimination in CO cases is his belief in a "right not to kill" (Ruesga 1995, 68-69). People who share Ruesga's view feel that the government's discrimination with regard to CO status is a violation of the rights that are promised to the US citizen in our society.

Essentially, forcing people to kill by drafting them goes against American society's tradition of respecting individual rights and freedom of choice in matters of morals and lifestyle. Ruesga, and others who share his belief in a human right not to be forced to kill, therefore object to the government's authority to deny individuals CO status for reasons that fall under individualist conservatism.

Sources:

Ruesga, G. Albert. "Selective conscientious objection and the right not to kill." Social Theory & Practice (Spring95) Vol. 21 Issue 1: 61-81.

Stewart-Winter, Timothy. "Not a Soldier, Not a Slacker: Conscientious Objectors and Male Citizenship in the United States during the Second World War." Gender & History (Nov2007) Vol. 19 Issue 3: 519-542.

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