Brendlin, Bruce v. California
Facts: On November 27, 2001 in Yuba City, California, officer Robert Brokenbrough noticed a 1993 Buick with expired tags. He radioed dispatch to inquire as to whether or not the owner was in the process of obtaining new tags, which he was. Officer Brokenbrough noticed a temporary permit in the rear window, but, unsure of whether the permit matched the vehicle, Brokenbrough pulled the car over. Upon talking with the driver, the officer thought he recognized the passenger as Bruce Brendlin, who had skipped parole. The officer was correct and discovered there was a warrant for Brendlin's arrest. The officer returned to the Buick, ordered Brendlin out of the car and placed him under arrest. The officer then searched the vehicle, finding more than 12 grams of marijuana and equipment for manufacturing methamphetamine. At the trial, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence, invoking the 4th amendment prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures." The court denied his motion, saying that only the driver had been detained until the officer recognized Brendlin as a parolee at large and placed him under arrest (Altman).
Issue: In this case, the question at hand was whether a passenger in a vehicle that has been stopped by the police is "seized," according to the 4th Amendment, and thereby able to question the legality of the traffic stop? (Altman)
Decision: The trial court denied that Brendlin had actually been seized until the officer arrested him based on the violation of his parole. Therefore, the court stated that Brendlin lacked standing to suppress the evidence against him (Altman). California's 3rd District Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's decision. In his majority opinion, Judge Arthur Scotland stated that, "A common sense application of Fourth Amendment principles leads to the conclusion that a traffic stop constitutes at least a momentary seizure of everyone in the car." He added that, "By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the passenger is free to go from the point at which the driver yields to the officer's show of authority." Scotland also said that the police officer had, at best, a "hunch" and "unreasonably and unlawfully" conducted the stop (Altman). The case then went to the California Supreme Court, where the Appeals court's decision was overturned by a 4-3 split vote. The state did not want to see Brendlin go free, and therefore had to prove that he was not seized. To do this, the court had to consider eight contrary federal appellate decisions that a passenger is seized when the car is stopped (Altman). Also, the court had to circumvent the precedent set in U.S. v. Mendenhall, which states "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment [if] a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave" (Altman). The California Supreme Court had to interpret Mendenhall very narrowly in order to justify its decision. Judge Marvin Baxter stated in his opinion that, seizure requires "an actual taking into custody, whether by the application of physical force or by submission to the assertion of authority" (Altman). In this case, the seizure would not have occurred until Brendlin had been arrested. Following this decision, Brendlin petitioned for a writ of certiorari and his case was called up by the Supreme Court. In an opinion that surprised some experts, the court unanimously overturned the California Supreme Court's decision. Justice David Souter wrote for the court, "We think that in these circumstances, any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission. . . a traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts the driver." The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Given the decision handed down by the Supreme Court, what will its significance likely be? This decision likely means that police will be forced to be more selective when pulling over vehicles. The precedent will require that police have more than a hunch when making stops, so as not to have a person such as Brendlin walk free because of a technical error. ACLU National Legal Director David Shapiro stated, "Today's decision means that the police will no longer receive a free pass to violate the Constitution when they stop a car and its passengers without reason to believe that anyone in the car has violated the law. . .By recognizing that the average passenger does not feel free to leave the scene when the police pull over a car, the Court's decision reflects commonsense" (Altman). Most of the time we see in the news cases dealing with the 1st and 2nd Amendments. This decision does not merely limit police discretion to pull over a vehicle, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the 4th amendment (an amendment which has taken a beating since the Bush Administration began its reign and instituted such legislation as the Patriot Act) as an ideal toward which society should aspire. In terms of the Criminal Justice System as a whole, I believe that at least three elements will become commonplace: First, Brendlin will initially be overly cited and used as a defense in cases where someone was pulled over by the police. This may initially cause more confusion and complexity in similar cases, but will eventually be correctly interpreted and applied by most courts. My second theory is that police may be more reluctant to pull people over. This will result in fewer cases going to court as a result of traffic stops, which means that some people, who may not have gotten away with a secondary offense upon being pulled over and searched, will now be left undiscovered. Thirdly, and contrary to the aforementioned second theory, is that police may not heed the Brendlin precedent and just as many people will be taken to court, but that many of the cases will be thrown out due to lack of reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officer to conduct the stop.
But why the unanimous decision in a court that is usually split? Hoping to find some deeply analytical legal prose on the subject, most of what I have researched has amounted to what I believe to be an endangered species in today's society: commonsense. First, I would like to note that this analysis rests clearly on the issue at hand. Though I must believe from the evidence and reasoning presented that the initial stop was unconstitutional, I firmly believe that California should find an alternate route in the prosecution of Brendlin for his parole violation and possession of controlled substances and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine, in spite of the illegality of the stop. The issue at hand is not what his crimes were, but whether or not he is considered "seized" according to the 4th Amendment. Immediately after reading this case, I had to ask myself how the California Supreme Court, and the trial court, could come to the conclusion that the passenger in the car is not seized under the requirements of the 4th Amendment? The answer lies in the presumption that California did not want to lose Brendlin based on an officer's technical error. To achieve this goal, the California Supreme Court had to disregard firmly grounded precedent set by all nine Circuit Courts and by seven out of nine state supreme courts that had dealt with the issue. It also had to try the case based on the alternative questions of the officer's intent and whether Brendlin was the primary subject of the officer's investigation. First is the fact that California disregarded precedent. In Florida v. Bostick, the court held that "a person is seized and thus entitled to challenge the government's action when officers, by physical force or a show of authority, terminate or restrain the person's freedom of movement through means intentionally applied" (501 U. S. 429, 434). In this case, the officer demonstrates authority by pulling the car over and simultaneously restrains Brendlin's movement, as Brendlin is in the car that is being pulled over and could not be otherwise without heightened risk of severe injury or death. Therefore, Brendlin is seized when the officer pulls the car over. In California v. Hodari, the court held that there is no seizure without the person's actual submission (499 U. S. 621, 626) when the officer's intent to restrain is not unambiguous, or unless submission takes the form of passive acquiescence. Justice Souter added that, in the absence of unambiguous show of intent by the police officer and of passive acquiescence by the subject, a test must be devised to determine seizure. That test was handed down by the ruling from another 4th Amendment case in United States v. Mendenhall. This test asks whether a reasonable person in a certain position would believe himself to be free from the officer's authority (United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554). The Supreme Court says that a reasonable person in Brendlin's position would not feel free from the officer's authority. The California Supreme Court stated that Brendlin was not seized until the officer actually placed him under arrest. The reasonable person test rejects this claim. To further justify its claim the California Supreme Court said that, because Brendlin was not the subject of the officer's intentions, he was not seized. Here, the court shifts the focus away from the objective intent of the police (pulling the car over). Souter writes that the Supreme Court "repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce this kind of subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis." Just in case the California Supreme Court still tried to dodge precedent by saying that seizure applies only to drivers, Souter adds, "although we have not, until today, squarely answered the question whether a passenger is also seized, we have said over and over in dicta that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver" (Delaware v. Prouse, Colorado v. Bannister, Berkemer v. McCarty).
There are dozens of references in the opinion of the court that, in different ways, states that in no way can it be shown that Brendlin was not seized. In summary, the court concluded that:
The officer demonstrated authority by pulling the car over.
The action of pulling over the car necessarily detains, or "seizes," every person in the car.
The action of pulling the car over satisfied the requirement that a seized person must have his movement restrained.
Brendlin submitted to the officer's authority by not leaving the vehicle.
Even if Brendlin had not submitted, a reasonable person in Brendlin's situation would not have considered himself to be free from the officer's authority.
Brendlin did not feel he was able to terminate the encounter with the officer.
Additionally, one of the most important goals of the all police agencies is that their officers are as safe from harm as possible. Most of the time, this requires that all subjects of the officer's actions remain under his or her control at all times, further justifying the assertion that the passenger was seized, if for no other reason than to protect himself. The court addresses this subject as well when Souter writes "It is also reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety."
I realize that I have, thus far, only criticized the California Supreme Court while using The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion to justify the criticism. Admittedly, I have found it difficult to criticize the Supreme Court (without playing the part of the devil's advocate) because of its thorough, well-reasoned, unanimous decision. However, upon rumination and several readings of the opinion, I have noticed several instances where Souter bolsters the power and authority of police officers with his language. We expect that police officers should be authoritative. But I believe Souter's language comes dangerously close to giving police a free pass to be authoritarian. Souter cites Maryland v. Wilson that suggests it is best for the officer to "routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation" (keyword = "unquestioned"). He proceeds to quote the opinion from Florida v. Bostick that states a person is seized when the officer "by means of physical force or show of authority" terminates or restrains his freedom of movement. The term "physical force" should come with a cautionary note that physical force should be used only when necessary. I believe the court should be careful when using such powerful language. Police officers are authority figures in the community, but should also have a sense of humility and of respect for the community. I believe this terminology acknowledges and, due to the lack of caution, almost encourages authoritarian behavior.
I had briefly considered the point that their decision may too narrowly define a seized person. What would happen if a mentally ill person were in the same position? The court indirectly addresses this point with the reasonable person test. It is likely that a mentally ill person would not be presumed legally "reasonable" and therefore would not pass the reasonable person test. I believe that, had Brendlin been mentally ill, he would not have been found to be seized. Also, I noticed the requirement that a person must submit or be brought into submission by physical force in order to be seized. What if Brendlin had run and not been caught? I then realized that, had Brendlin run, he would not have been found seized based on the illegal nature of the stop. He also could not have been charged, or at least convicted, of resisting arrest or fleeing a police officer based on the same premise.
In conclusion, other than the objections that I have made, I find that the decision handed down reflects reason, wisdom, thoroughness, and common sense, and I praise the Supreme Court for their affirmation of the importance of the 4th Amendment.