by Marsha Ford

Created on: December 29, 2008

While it would seem simple and even logical to say unclassified information should not be kept secret, I would argue that there are compelling reasons for doing so. The key aspect in determining if information should be kept secret is not ifis classified, but whether or not it is sensitive.'

Information and materials are classified when their content includes information that could directly pose a threat to national security if released. But some information can pose an indirect threat, despite not meeting the standards for being classified. Examples can include seemingly innocent materials like telephone directories or detailed organizational charts. By themselves they do not reveal national security information, but they can - and have been - used to gain access to individuals holding valuable knowledge regarding classified materials and programs. These, and materials like them, have also been used as part of large-scale information gathering, putting together enough unclassified information to obtain important indications about classified programs.

The examples I provide here are not based on imagined scenarios; they come from my actual experiences. As an intelligence investigator in the U.S. Army, I regularly investigated these types of occurrences. In one case I investigated, a local woman would repeatedly approach and start relationships with young soldiers. While in these relationships, she would collect the names and other unclassified information on other members of the men's units. She would also make note of their deployments and any other details she could obtain. She would then sell or provide this information to her country's intelligence organization. By itself, none of the information she provided was classified, but it was enough to provide information on the deployments and personnel involved in classified operations.

The solution might seem to be to make documents like phone directories classified, but this would present its own set of problems. These types of materials need to be readily available to an organization's members, but classified materials require background investigations (initial and recurring), indoctrination briefings and debriefings, established access-control procedures, and enhanced storage security measures. To require these procedures for all personnel and all sensitive materials would be both unwieldy to maintain and prohibitively expensive.

One solution currently used for information that is unclassified but potentially sensitive is the use of a separate type of classification called "Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)." SBU is used specifically to bridge the gap between classified and unclassified, while also working to provide some level of control over such materials. It may not be a perfect solution, but it does serve an important, needed function.

All this is not to suggest that a simple claim of sensitive should be enough to keep any and all information secret. Boundaries must be clearly established and enforced to prevent any government agency from holding information secret simply for convenience or to avoid transparency. But this must also be balanced with the need to ensure that information is not used - even indirectly - to compromise our security.

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