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Reactions to President Bush's speech on adding 20,000+ more troops in Iraq

by Scott O'Reilly

President Bush is preparing to send more than 20,000 U.S. troops to improve the security situation in Baghdad. Opponents of the war contend this escalation is intended to delay a catastrophic failure until after Mr. Bush leaves office. For those who supported ousting Saddam, however, a surge in U.S. forces is perhaps the last best chance to secure a positive or at least tolerable - outcome in Iraq. Not surprisingly, each side in this debate expresses deep mistrust of the other; the anti-war camp believes the war was waged under false pretenses (hence they believe is virtually doomed to fail), while the pro-surge crowd has convinced themselves that opponents of the war want America to lose. The animosity between the two sides is so palpable, however, that it obscures the fact that each side does have valid points to make. It worth examining these carefully, before coming out for or against a surge, because the decision to support a troop increase or not is arguably the most momentous and complex moral decision America is likely to face in the coming years, more important even than the decision to go to war in the first place.

In making the case to invade Iraq the Bush Administration asserted, "the risks of inaction were greater than the risks of action." Like many of the administration's confident claims about Iraq this has proven false. Invading Iraq has greatly weakened America morally, strategically, and militarily. Indeed, the biggest beneficiary of America's invasion may be Iran, which thanks to its influence in a Shia dominated Iraq stands to emerge as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Further, the fact that nearly 150,000 U.S. troops are bogged down in Iraq has greatly complicated America's ability to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Regardless of whether America should or should not have invaded Iraq, a hasty withdrawal is going to compound America's problems in excruciating ways. First, a precipitous withdrawal will almost certainly consign Iraq to a genocidal civil war that will kill hundreds of thousands and create millions of refugees. Wholesale ethnic cleansing is likely to draw in Iraq's neighbors as Saudi Arabia and Jordan seek to protect their Sunni brethren, while Iran moves into to support their oil-rich Shia allies. In such a scenario the Kurds are all but certain to declare independence, a fact that will invite Turkey to try a quash a Kurdish state (the creation of which would generate unrest among Turkey's Kurdish population). In short, what began as a Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq could very easily escalate into regional conflagration.

In such a scenario the price of oil, needless to say, would skyrocket. Worse still, higher oil revenues would feed the forces of radicalism, anti-Americanism, and fundamentalism in the region. Economic and social development, which is so crucial to lifting the Middle East out of the cycle that breeds resentment of the West and terrorism, would be set back decades.

If a surge could reduce this possibility it would be worth it (in the sense of being the least bad of some really bad options). There is at least some hope it could achieve this aim. First, for the first time the United States is going to make establish security for Iraq's citizens the top priority. Second, General Petraeus, who Bush picked to lead U.S. forces in Iraq, is almost certainly America's most brilliant field commander, and he wrote the Army's new counterinsurgency manual. His prior efforts to secure Mosul were among the military's most successful at least successful efforts in Iraq, though insurgents have since re-infiltrated the city. And third, focusing intensely on Baghdad the center of gravity in Iraq and committing a combination of American firepower and economic resources could convince many residents that they have more to gain from us than they do from siding with the local militias and gangs. To succeed, however, U.S. forces will have to learn the lesson of past failures, and overcome significant language and cultural barriers.

There are many obstacles to a successful outcome. First, the U.S. is asking the Maliki government to disarm and neutralize al-Sadr's Badr Brigade, which is widely considered to be the power behind the throne, so to speak, of the Maliki government. Second, for Maliki's government to succeed it must prove itself to be a true unity government aimed at national reconciliation, which means reaching out to Sunnis. To date, as the recent taunts at Saddam's execution attest, it has completely failed at this task. And third, the U.S. must walk an extremely delicate tightrope, since engagements or provocations in certain areas, Sadr City, for instance, could ignite a civil war among competing Shia factions, or lead to major conflicts between U.S. forces and formidable Iraqi militias in an urban environment. Needless to say, even it the U.S. prevails in such conflicts it will do so at the cost of undermining the larger mission.

The United States is in a dicey situation. On the one hand, it needs to reduce the influence of the Shia firebrand Moktada al-Sadr, but on the other hand it has to be very careful about the possibility of facing as many as the70,000 militia Sadr could count on to defend himself and Sadr city. Further, the infusion of 20,000 U.S. troops is still far below the ratio most counterinsurgency experts believe is necessary to defeat an insurgency. For these reasons, and many others, a surge President Bush is proposing is very risky.

President Bush's decision to surge troops into Baghdad flies in the face of the advice made by the Iraqi Study Group (ISG), particular its recommendations to begin a gradual draw down of U.S. troops and to engage Iran and Syria diplomatically in order to secure their help in defusing the situation in Iraq. Ultimately, I believe the direction proposed by the ISG is sounder than the idea of a surge Bush is proposing. In many ways, Bush's decision to eschew diplomacy and insist that every problem America faces must have a military solution is what got us into the mess in Iraq in the first place. It's strains credulity to think that is what will get us out.

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