Iran's Underlying Goals...
(originally posted 01 December 2006)
While reading Charles Krauthammer's December 1st op-ed piece about Iraq, I was struck with a quite-simple maxim that will ring clearly for any political-science or international-affairs student that paid even a modicum of attention in even one of his or her classes: Iraq and Iran (or, alternately, Arabia and Persia) are historical enemies with little to no vested interest in the continued security or, even, prosperity of the other state. Even before their names were codified, so alike yet so different by that altered terminal character, the two were in a continual dispute over borders, shoreline rights, or simply for the sake of blood feud. Cyrus Partovi, a professor at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, was the first to fully illuminate the extent of the collective hatred for me; as a former high-ranking official (akin to Undersecretary of State) in the pre-revolution Iranian government, Partovi lent an air of personal legitimacy that made his words resound and reverberate through my cortex.
And now, with Cyrus's dissertations reinvigorated in my memory, I read that Iraq is in need of political reform...that a military solution is too costly to ever be viable. Well, certainly the past three years have proven that fact! Ripping apart the mentality that has our elected leaders waiting for former Secretary of State James Baker to come out with his bipartisan report and subsequently the treasure chest of buried solutions, Krauthammer states that the solution to the Iraqi conflict has always been political; until Sunni, Shiite and Kurd alike have an uninhibited say in the workings of the arbitrary borders bestowed upon them by the British a century ago, there will continue to be insurgency and conflict. And, though Bush continues to loathe the admission that, much like Vietnam, Iraq cannot go forward with reconciliation and reconstruction until U.S. forces are fully removed from the region. But Krauthammer continues by stating that, with Iraq poised to turn to Syria and Iran for help, we are seeing a Pandora's box being opened that could keep Iraq de-stabilized for another several decades.
Because of their own past and present enmity concerning American foreign relations, both Iran and Syria seem willing and ready to step up in helping to resolve the ongoing civil war/unrest (call it what you wish...) in the Fertile Crescent. On its face, this appears a laudable offer of two regional powers rising above historical differences to assist a fellow regional state actor in regaining its foundation after years of near-anarchy. But, looking closer, this really begins to reek of a simple attempt to air themselves in a more positive light with Wahington. Following the implications of state-sponsored assassination after the death of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, Syria has begun to feel the sting of international pressure. Implicated by a UN-backed tribunal in the death of Hariri and still garnering the label of "state sponsor of terrorism" by the U.S. government, Damascus would stand in a warmer glow if they were to step into the fray.
And Iran stands to gain even more. Their involvement would potentially drop all threat of UN sanctions from their continued development of nuclear capabilities, thaw animosities between Tehran and Washington, and lead the country into a better international standing. But Iran, as a historical enemy, should be invited with one hand but held at a safe distance by another. Tehran has already stated that no peace can be lasting without full American military withdrawal from Iraqi borders...hardly the words of a fully-cooperative ally. As Krauthammer states, Syria and Iraq stand to be served better by an Iraq in chaos than an Iraq democratic and empowered. They appear more stable in effect, and can devote their energies to more pressing international matters than keeping their resource-rich, peace-weak neighbor at bay. The resources expended in the eight-year, eighties-defining Iran-Iraq war were Himalayan in their proportions; Tehran is better served - both in terms of retaining focus and maintaining fiscal clarity - in its quest to build what they claim to be a peaceful nuclear program if they are not having to contend with a strong Iraqi government. Because, as history has proven too many times, with governmental power comes military might...but Tehran stands to gain more in international prestige (and a let-up in the outcry for sanctions) if it assists Baghdad in its attempt to centralize and integrate all groups within its borders than it does in keeping Iraq volatile...
It stands true in all this that the solution for all parties is an Iraq politically stable and free from insurgency. The United States would at least save some face and prevent an exact replica of the Vietnam farce; Iraq would be integrated and free from autocracy; Iran and Syria would gain the positive international press and accolades they need to take pressure off their controversies. And, with three cooperative state actors in the region, Western interests are better protected and a larger group of Arab and Persian peoples benefit from Western currency flow. Benefits can be found from having more voices and opinions: as everyone's drooling anticipation for the Baker commission report indicates, a fresh opinion is going to be the ONLY way to get a viable solution for long-term Iraqi stability in play. Yet take Syrian and Iranian intervention for exactly what it is worth. The two nations are offering their services in an attempt to benefit personally - nothing more, nothing less. Any benefits derived from success in Iraq would come not from cooperative relations with that state; personal rivalries are too entrenched to ever truly allow for fully-transparent congenial relations. The only benefit comes with international recognition and status...
CAVEAT EMPTOR