by Davis Horner

Created on: August 22, 2008

John Bell Hood of Texas had several successes as a military commander. His courage and aggressiveness were unquestioned, marked by the severe wounds he received at Gettysburg and Chicamauga. As long as he was on the attack, he was an effective general.
Jefferson Davis' decision, however, to replace Joseph E. Johnson with Hood as Commander of the Army of Tennessee during the summer of 1864 was shortsighted at best, and strategically flawed.

Johnston had inherited the Army of the Tennessee command after the disastrous tenure of Braxton Bragg. In addition to the love and respect of those under his command, Johnston had a talent for strategic and defensive warfare. As Sherman's Army set its sights on Atlanta, Johnston's strategy involved either quick attacks on Union troops, or drawing the Federals into attacking Johnston's entrenched positions. Always he was careful not to commit the major part of his forces into an assault, and always he maneuvered his army, intact, between Sherman and Atlanta. Through a series of flanking movements, the Federals were advancing on Atlanta, but for Sherman the advance was frustratingly slow and the losses were heavy.
The U.S. presidential campaign was in full swing that summer, and Lincoln's changes for re-election were looking grim. General George McClellan was running against him, promising a peace initiative between the warring states, and perhaps a ceasefire and an end to the terrible bloodshed. As long as Atlanta held, the McClellan campaign gained momentum.
Within the Confederacy, however, people were of a different mind. The closer Sherman came to Atlanta - thought just months earlier to be impregnable - the more alarmed were the government and the people. The pressure grew until Davis decided to relieve Johnston of his command and replace him with John Bell Hood.
Hood immediately went on the attack, doing what he did best. The results were disastrous. He didn't have the strength to defeat Sherman's army with his weary and starving troops, even when the Union forces were split or when they were caught unawares. Sherman's victories at Peachtree Creek, Ezra Church, Decatur and Jonesboro, allowed him to quickly tighten the noose around the city. Hood's army, fractured and defeated, evacuated Atlanta on September 2nd.
The Fall of Atlanta, history unanimously declares, was a gift to the Lincoln re-election campaign. Sherman's army had won a major victory and now marched through Georgia with little opposition. Until this disaster, the Confederacy could reasonably hope for some kind of negotiated settlement with the United States, but the defeat of Atlanta effectively ended all of its options.
As Sherman continued his fabled "March to the Sea", Hood's army tried to harrass Union forces and supply lines, but were largely ineffective. Then, as if to solidify reputation as a fierce, but rash, commander, he led his army in an ill-fated invasion of Tennessee in November of 1864. Defeats at Franklin and Nashville, Tennessee were the final calamity for the Army of Tennessee. Six Confederate Generals were killed in action and one captured at Franklin. None of the 10,000 casulties suffered during the Tennessee campaign could be replaced.
Hood's failure of command was not his alone. The much maligned Jefferson Davis bears a great part of the responsibility for his failure to see the larger scope of the Atlanta Campaign and its political consequences. Hood's greatest strength was offensive warfare, but it also proved his ultimate undoing, as well as the last hope of the Confederacy.

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