The events of the last few days have seen a little known dispute over a small area in one of Europe's forgotten countries played out as a war on our television screens. Were it not for the intervention of Russia, the incident might have remained pretty much out of the public eye but is Russia right to intervene and can Georgia expect the help of the international community?
I visited the former Soviet Republic of Georgia in 2006. It's a beautiful little country with the Black sea on its western side and the Caucasus mountains forming a natural barrier with Russia to the east. It's a country trying to drag itself up from decades of being run down by the Soviet Union, one that has become an open and enthusiastic ally of the west and has ambitions of joining NATO. However, it also has two major problems that threaten to destabilize it and throw into jeopardy its chances of becoming more than just a little country of the periphery of Europe.
Georgia's problems are Abkhazia and South Ossetia; they were both problems for us as we travelled around the Black Sea because they lie in border areas, which of course, is why the Russian population in both regions is large enough to provoke demands for independence from Georgia. The problems re-surfacing in August 2008 are essentially related to South Ossetia but it is inevitable that the issues in Abkhazia will start to become more prominent.
South Ossetia was created as an autonomous region when the Soviet Union took over Georgia in the 1920s. North Ossetia was created on the Russian side of the border and the people of the region, who had also been pro-Russian, were rewarded' for their loyalty and for not resisting Russia's incursions in order to expand her empire as other peoples of the Caucasus had done.
However in the late 1980s when the first rumblings of independence began, South Ossetians began to get themselves ready to resist because they feared they would lose their autonomy in an independent Georgia. In 1989 and 1990 bloody clashes took place between opposing factions in the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali. Georgia became independent in 1991 and for the next couple of years the violence continued albeit more sporadically, until 1992 when they Russians, Georgians and South Ossetians managed to reach an uneasy agreement about deploying peace-keeping forces in the region. Under the pro-Russian Edvard Schevardnadze things became fairly quiet but when the Georgian people staged the Pink Revolution' and installed what they believed was real democracy the determination of new President Saakashvili to bring into the fold these unsettled regions the violence began once more to flare up.
In 2006 when I visited I was unable to visit parts of the Caucasus because of the risk from the conflict; tourists were considered at risk of either kidnap for political gain or else accidental death or injury in little pockets of fighting that were unpredictable and bloody. To cross from Georgia into Russia we had to go by sea because the region of Abkhazia borders Russia and the borders are closed to non-Russians. This poses problems for Georgia in safely and securely policing its own borders and opening the country up to tourism.
In the past Saakashvili has offered the South Ossetians some concessions, most notably autonomy within Georgia but South Ossetian demands have increased and in November 2006 ethnic Russians in the region voted for full independence. The Georgian government, however, still has a duty to the ethnic-Georgians living in the region who have repeatedly voted in favour of remaining an integral part of Georgia with rule from Tbilisi.
And now in 2008, Saakashvili has tried to make good his promise of reining in this troublesome region by marching troops into South Ossetia and re-establishing control. Faced with firm resistance they are reported to have bombed the South Ossetian capital and thousands of civilians have fled towards the Russian border looking for refugee status or else are cowering in the basements of their tenement buildings taking cover from the shelling.
To protect the people it regards as Russian, Moscow has sent troops into the region but its actions have gone further than the troubled border zone. Saying that no area that has played a part in the events of South Ossetia can be thought of as safe, Russian planes have bombed the Georgian city of Gori where there is a large military base and are reported to have bombed an airfield close to the Georgian capital Tbilisi.
In a stalemate the Russians have refused to respond to a request for a ceasefire from Tbilisi saying that their troops will only withdraw if Georgian troops do as well. President Putin has launched a scathing verbal attack on the Georgian government, at the heart of which are allegations that Georgia is trying to involve other countries in a dispute that not concern anyone else and pouring scorn on Georgia's ambitions to join NATO. Of course, Moscow must surely feel resentment at the events in this part of Europe in recent years; the openness with which Ukraine and Georgia have pursued relations with the West and the recent independence of Kosovo from Serbia a staunch ally of Russia have put Russia's nose out of joint and have no doubt increased the desire to reinforce her military strength and capabilities within the region, a public flexing of muscle if you will.
Those who believe that Georgia is in the right say that the Russians want to prolong the conflict in the hope that it brings down Saakashvili's government. The Russians have always backed the South Ossetians and it is likely they have supplied arms and other financial backing to the South Ossetian nationalists. But what of Saakashvili's actions in marching into the region, fully aware that the Russians will respond in no uncertain terms? A foolish move and one that was always going to result in bloodshed? In military terms Georgia is dwarfed by Russia and even a claim that Georgia will recall two thousand of her troops currently stationed in Iraq can hardly help her campaign; both on the ground and in the air Georgia can not compete.
Commentators have suggested that Saakashvili is hoping that NATO will step in the help its young and enthusiastic protg. However, the question must be considered of whether NATO would risk entering into a conflict with Russia given the long Cold War and the relative cordiality of relations since that ended.
The major NATO players are unlikely to volunteer physical assistance in the form of troops although the UK and France have issued statements denouncing the violence and warning Russia that they cannot support her actions. The UN more or less finds itself ineffective because any statement it might wish to release can be vetoed by Russia and Russia knows she can stop any attempts to stabilise the situation that are not in her favour.
While NATO and individual governments may not officially offer assistance to Georgia in the shape of arms or troops, there is the chance that individuals may travel to Georgia from countries that were once part of the Soviet Union or satellite states now free of Communism, people who are against the way that Russia continually seeks to emphasise her hold over the region and who will gladly volunteer to fight alongside the Georgians to show their belief that the Russians should not be able to ride roughshod over Georgian territory.
Whatever happens, it is clear that this is not a conflict that will end quickly. While the Georgians look to NATO to help them, Putin will dig his heels in further. He has made no secret of his determination that Georgia should not join NATO and such is his scorn for the organisation that he is unlikely to enter into any dialogue with NATO officials. With the rest of Europe unwilling to enter a potentially long and violent conflict and Russia able to block any UN action it seems that the only likely winner is Russia.