The antecedents of corruption and mediocrity that had characterized Venezuelan politics during much of the twentieth century were an acceptable excuse in 1998 for electing as president a little known coroner whose only political experience had been a failed coup attempt. Once the people invested their hopes in the charismatic Hugo Chavez, his controversial ideas and policies ignited the polarization of his country and the whole subcontinent.
At the same time that Chavez started to know what power felt like, and to develop an inescapable craving for it, Colombia was giving itself what at the moment seemed the last chance of ending a lifetime of horror and desperation. President Andres Pastrana had formally opened peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, in Spanish). However, instead of contributing their part in the task of leaving behind two generations of war, the guerrilla group preferred to take advantage of the situation and strengthen their operations in kidnapping, drug traffic, and international lobbying. Not surprisingly, the negotiations failed, and Alvaro Uribe was elected in 2002 on the collective wish to defeat terrorism at all costs.
Meanwhile, Chavez had been building a network of support all over South America for his socialist project. Brazil, Chile and Uruguay changed to moderate left-wing regimes. Bolivia and Ecuador would choose a more radical course. But Colombia was still immersed in the bitter fruits of communist insurgency. Just when Chavez was showing South America a new path to the left, Colombia wasn't in the mood to hear anything about it.
Both Uribe and Chavez have strong personalities, and rarely have they been able to go through their disagreements without mutual recriminations. The difference is in style: Uribe relies on hammering down the same arguments time and again, while Chavez is much more impatient and cannot avoid resorting to malicious innuendo, carefully worded implications or blatant profanity if he feels the situation merits it. The Venezuelan president's relationship with Colombia has thus been hindered by a combination of bad timing, bad taste, bad manners, and more than the healthy amount of fanaticism.
The recent clashes with Ecuador are little more than an extension by proxy of the same basic disagreement over the role that left-wing ideals can play in the transformation of societies. In Colombia, FARC's position is hopeless. Deprived of support from the people, academia, and even left-wing politicians, they are relying on their ability to fool other countries into believing they are a legitimate rebel group fighting for a valid cause. Chavez is happy to buy this story, but it has cost him dearly in respectability. He still hasn't found the acceptable terms in which his sympathy for the Colombian guerrilla may be expressed in order to grant them some political space, and Colombia has rejected vigorously each such attempt. Whenever it becomes too scandalous for him to return to the matter, he delegates the task to his allies in Ecuador and Nicaragua, who are now taking turns speaking favorably of FARC while he buys time to regain his good image.
The increase in tension between Colombia and Venezuela parallels the growing pressure felt by their presidents. Uribe needs to show visible results against terrorism that serve as a suitable justification for his having been elected and re-elected. Chavez is desperate to appear as everyone's friend and benefactor. These two agendas oppose each other, for Uribe is intent on defeating an ideological force Chavez can't afford to lose. With both leaders vying for constitutional reforms that would allow for their continuance in power, we can only expect their differences to escalate.