There are two dominant approaches in ethical theory. One approach maintains that we judge actions by their consequences and the other maintains that we judge actions by appeal to rules. The second theory, called deontology, will be addressed in the next lecture. The first theory, utilitarianism, we will consider now.
The idea of applying utility to ethics has its roots in 18th century philosophy. David Hume mentions it in his Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and Adam Smith devotes a portion of his Theory of Moral Sentiments to the concept. However, as a fully formed ethical theory, utilitarianism was the product of two philosophers in the 19th century. The first of these was British philosopher Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham began with what he considered to be a self evident psychological principle. Human beings act in accordance with two motives: the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This being the case, the principle of utility can be formulated as "the doctrine that we ought to act so as to promote the greatest balance of pleasure over pain." However, there are two problems with this initial formulation. First, it seems overly concerned with pleasure as opposed to right action or behavior. The second problem is that this principle of utility doesn't address whose pleasure we should be concerned with.
From Bentham's perspective the first problem was not a problem at all. Good, strictly speaking, is equated with pleasure. The pursuit of pleasure simply is the pursuit of good. And as we'll see momentarily, for Bentham what counts is the quantity of pleasure. However, the second problem needs addressing. Bentham was concerned not only with self satisfaction but also with social reform. This being the case, Bentham reformulated the principle of utility to say "that we ought to act so as to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Note also, the change in terminology from pleasure to happiness. This is to remind us that the utilitarians are not only concerned with physical pleasure and pain, but all types of pleasure.
Bentham's version of utilitarianism emphasized the quantity of pleasure and he actually developed a way of calculating the quantity in order to determine the correctness of any given action. This "hedonic calculus" consisted of seven points which included the intensity of the pleasure, its duration, certainty, and extent. So from a purely quantitative perspective various pleasures were identical as long as their numerical value on the calculus was identical. This is what led Bentham to say that "the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either.
As inviting as it might be to quantify ethical theory there may be problems with this approach. First, how can pleasure or happiness really be quantified? Whatever scale we might use seems inherently arbitrary. Even the choice of which scale to use is arbitrary. Plus, if we were to formulate some objective criteria to evaluate and quantify pleasure and pain, it would seem that this would be the foundation of ethical theory instead of utility. A second problem is that this quantitative approach implies a sort of relativism of values. Between two competing goods, for example reading poetry and playing a game, is there really no way to distinguish them? If so, then there seems to be no way of making sense out of the central normative feature of any ethical theory. For example, if I were to say that you ought to tell the truth, but you get just as much quantitative value out of lying, then you are perfectly justified in lying. To say the least, this seems odd. There may be an alternative.
The alternative was offered by a student of Bentham named John Stuart Mill. While he was deeply impressed by the utilitarian theory of Bentham, he did think that certain modifications were needed. In particular, Mill wanted to de-emphasize quantity in favor of quality with regard to happiness. To illustrate the difference Mill asked whether anyone would rather be a pig satisfied than a human being dissatisfied. The idea is that when it comes to happiness quantity is not enough. It's not the amount of happiness that counts but the kind of happiness. Another way of putting this is to say that some pursuits are inherently better than others. How can Mill justify this claim?
The answer goes back to an idea developed by Aristotle. To be truly happy, human beings must fulfill their potential. Part of this potential is to be rational agents. So any pursuits which require a rational component are inherently better than those pursuits which do not require such capacity. Here, better means more effective at creating happiness. So Mill's point is that the conditions for human happiness are different and related to our rational capacity. Still, we need clear criteria for deciding which actions to take to achieve happiness. For example, how can we decide between two activities if we've only tried one? The answer, for Mill, is simple. We rely on the expertise of those who have tried both. According to Mill, those who have tried both inevitably choose for the higher pleasure thus illustrating that it is the correct choice.
This leads to a curious problem for Mill's version of utilitarianism. How can we prove the validity of the claim that certain actions are the correct ones to pursue? In short, how can the principle of utility itself be proven? Again, Mill appeals to Aristotle. As he points out, in his short work titled Utilitarianism, "questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptance of the term." However, we can provide a proof of sorts. "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it, and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it."
Herein lays the problem. Can we really infer that something is desirable from the fact that people desire it? It seems not. This would imply that murder is desirable simply because some people desire it. We could think of worse examples but hopefully you see the point. As we saw in the lecture on challenges to morality, this is simply an instance of the is-ought problem. From a given fact we cannot infer that something ought to be the case. The irony of Mill committing such a basic logical fallacy is that he wrote a work titled System of Logic!
Another issue that we need to address is exactly how to apply the principle of utility to making decisions and carrying them out. Remember, the principle of utility says that we ought to act so as to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The question is whether we need to apply this to each specific act or simply to formulating ethical rules. Mill himself was somewhat unclear about this but 20th century utilitarians developed a distinction between two approaches: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. To see what's at issue, consider an example. Suppose you're driving down the street and you get to a light which is yellow and just about to turn red. As it turns you wonder whether you should run the light or stop.
An act utilitarian would say that in each and every case like this you need to apply the principle of utility and decide on a case by case basis. In some cases, it might be justified to run the red light. For example, if you're rushing your sick friend to the hospital. In other cases, like driving to the mall, you would be justified in stopping at the light. The point is that each case is different. On the other hand, a rule utilitarian would say that you should follow the rule in all cases. After all, the rule has been formulated by appealing to the principle of utility. So, to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number you follow the rule. Clearly, these are radically different approaches.
Whichever approach you take there are problems with the application of the principle of utility. We've seen that you might be able to justify running a red light with act utilitarianism. However, things might get worse. Since we are simply looking to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number, we are still thinking in quantitative terms. This, in spite Mill's qualitative approach. It would seem, then, that as long as we can insure that we have generated the greatest happiness for the greatest number, a small number might be allowed to be unhappy. In essence, we can purchase the happiness of the majority with the suffering of a minority. By this logic, utilitarianism could be used to justify discrimination of all sorts, or worse actions.
In addition to this, applying the principle of utility requires us to speculate. To judge the correctness of the action we have to await the consequences. Prior to this our analysis of the action's moral worth is somewhat of a guess. Granted, the outcomes of some actions are predictable, but many consequences are not. In fact, economists ever since Adam Smith have known that, for any given action, there will always be consequences that were unintended. Given the fact that we did not intend them, they are difficult to predict. However, we cannot adequately determine the action's moral worth without taking into account all consequences; intended and otherwise.
But utilitarianism has another problem which is more serious than a question of application. We can illustrate this problem with an example. Suppose I have a very wealthy and very sick relative; an uncle let's say. I don't like this uncle very much (by the way this is just an example!). Truth be told, I don't like going to the hospital either. But, I'm pretty sure I stand to inherit something after my uncle's death. Unless, of course, I do something to make him mad, like not visiting him in the hospital, in which case he'll write me out of the will. So, I decide to visit him. Now, from the standpoint of the principle of utility this is a good action. After all, all the consequences are good. My sick uncle is comforted in his time of need and I get the inheritance. But, isn't there something deeply troubling about this example. Even though utilitarianism justifies it, the action seems immoral. Why? Perhaps because my motivation for acting is immoral. In other words, it's not only consequences that matter when judging an action's moral worth, but also the reasons for acting.