Greeks

by Ronald Sellers

Created on: April 10, 2010   Last Updated: April 12, 2010

Thoughts on a hypothetical military conflict between the ancient Greeks and the ancient Chinese

As, in my opinion, in any examination of potential alternative history, the writer must at least begin from a point of the most plausible scenario. This would have occurred around 330 BC, when Alexander the Great defeated Indian forces East of the Indus River. This time is known, in regards to Chinese history, as the warring states period. Some writers will, in an attempt at levity, pit Alexander against Sun Tzu. The facts are that Sun Tzu died at least one hundred years before Alexander was born and none of his strategic wisdom was adopted by the warlords that arose after him and the fact that Alexander came much closer to China that Sun Tzu ever came to Greece. This establishes a most plausible scenario depicting an invasion, by Alexander, of a China ruled by disparate Chinese feudal military leaders.  The Kingdoms were not united, they were in fact, constantly warring between themselves and if faced by a motivated, coherent force, possessed of a sense of loyalty, discipline and unity of purpose, such as the army of Alexander, then theoretically; they could be summarily defeated piece meal. If warfare were as simple as placing antagonists on a mutually advantageous battle field and blowing a whistle to begin the contest, this article could end now. The authoritative voice of history as well as an examination of current military and political realities obscure the simple proposition of  pitting Greek against Chinese or General versus General. Again in the Greeks favor we know that Alexander would have been the only commander with even a remote ability to facilitate this conflict. On the Chinese side, however, given the frequently changing balance of power during this time period, the identity of who may have opposed Alexander is elusive at best. However, as stated earlier, warfare is seldom ever that simple.

The Greeks had some problems of their own. Not least of which was the refusal of Alexander's troops to continue any farther once they had secured the East Indus valley. They also had suffered both personnel and materiel depletion's in reaching the Eastern most limit of the Alexandrian conquest. In violation of  later promulgated principles of military strategist such as Jomini, Von Clausewitz and Machiavelli, Alexander had extened his logistical trains to the breaking point and to battle the Chinese he would have been compelled to completely cut loose from his supply trains in order to cross the Himalayas. As Hannibal later taught us, such a massive trans-alpine movement would have resulted in non combat fatalities of approximately forty percent of Alexander's already worn down forces with an equitable loss of materiel. Additionally, claims of Greek technological superiority are unfounded. It is true that at the time of this hypothetical conflict the Greeks would have had better close range weapons and tactics and an important advantage in cavalry operations, which would be needed to prevent massive infantry losses to the Chinese crossbows which would have easily penetrated Greek armor. This statement assumes that some or any of the Greek horse would have survived the Himalayas. This is, although, quite an assumption.

Regardless, Alexander was a military genius, perhaps the most brilliant, certainly the most accomplished military commander noted in recorded history. Had he descended from the Himalayas into China with anything resembling an intact, viable command, he would have swept through the Western Kingdoms of China. Given though, the immense size of China, her overpowering population, which at some point Alexander's presence would have forced to unite, and the military technology possessed by the Chinese, Alexander's presence in China would have been in the long term untenable.

Yes, had this conflict occurred the Greeks would have initially crushed the Chinese as they did all other opponents. Again we rely on a historical precedence and not mere conjecture. On the other hand Alexander would have eventually exhausted all resources requisite for waging war and would have found himself in the same predicament as Confederate General George Pickett's Division atop Seminary Ridge, they could get there-but they couldn't stay long.

Alexander was not only a military genius, but a political one as well and in both disciplines he demonstrated that he would do exactly opposite of what his opponents expected him to do. Invested, as he was with these qualities, Alexander may have been able to extract himself from the disaster described above, return to his Empire and salvage it from disintegration. Then again, even for Alexander, this would have been an almost miraculous accomplishment.

In short, given the military and political realities of the time, the Greeks would defeat the Chinese. Given also the social, logistical and geographic realities, the Greeks would have been expelled from China in short order. The Greeks would have quit themselves well, garnered an even greater degree of glory than history presently accords them but this conquest would have been known as Alexander's most short lived. It would have signaled the decline of the Macedonian Empire and could have quite conceivably required Alexander's life. As history has demonstrated, had the latter been a consequence of this action, the Empire of Alexander would have shattered on the spot as it did following his actual death in 323 BC.

Therefore, the choice of the Greeks as victors in this debate should be veiwed in the same light as the assertion that the Americans were militarily superior to the North Vietnamese in the 1960's and 1970's-they were, as evidenced by the fact that U.S. forces won every major engagement in Vietnam, but the questions are and should always be-for what, and at what cost?

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