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The Treaty of Versailles which determined the terms of peace between Germany and the Allied Powers was generally seen by all sides as unsatisfactory. In fact, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain foresaw a future world war in less than thirty years. According to Richard M. Watt, Lloyd George "had come to fear that the treaty was too harsh and unworkable, that perhaps it condemned Europe to another gigantic war." No one seemed to receive those things for which they hoped.
The Treaty of Versailles was the official end to World War I. The peace treaty was hammered out in six months with three nations emerging as the dominant forces. These Big Three were France with Premier Georges Clemenceau as delegation head, Great Britain with Lloyd George as delegation head, and the United States with President Woodrow Wilson as delegation head. The Italian head delegate Vittorio Emanuele Orlando is sometimes mentioned with the Big Three. Separate peace treaties were to be signed with Germany's allies (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey), each treaty conforming to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The main treaty was as fair as it could be despite some enormous obstacles.
One of the obstacles which had to be negotiated was the demands of the several nations which participated in the Peace Conference. History books record the names and photos of the Big Three (sometimes Big Four) but neglect to mention that, in all, five dominions claimed by Great Britain and twenty-seven countries were represented. For instance, Japanese delegates were there to ensure certain secret treaties made during the course of the war would be included. The delegates from China never did sign the final treaty.
Each of the delegation heads had promised their war-weary populaces some specific things. Lloyd George and Clemenceau both promised to make Germany and, to a lesser degree, the other defeated nations pay heavily for the tremendous damage and suffering their nations had incurred. France in particular had a history of difficulties with Germany and this fueled the French desire to permanently disable that country. One of these skirmishes was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to 1871, which France lost. The Treaty between France and Prussia that ended the Franco-Prussian war was an attempt by Bismarck to crush France. In it, Germany demanded an enormous amount of indemnity payment, twice what the country had actually used toward the war effort. France had carried animosity from this to the Peace Conference. Clemenceau, who was a young patriot during the Franco-Prussian war, exemplified the hatred of France toward Germany. Germany had expressed the same animosity toward France in the cries during the war of "Woe to the conquered." The British people were demanding Kaiser Wilhelm be tried in London and hanged for his role in the war.
The German delegation was not allowed to sit in on any of the Peace Conference or indicate their nation's disapproval over any of the treaty terms. This was not an unusual condition. Watt notes "The tradition of European wars had been that the loser paid an indemnity to the winner . . . the victor had simply taken all that could conveniently be seized." Treaties are rarely designed to allow the defeated ones to retain very much. When the Treaty of Versailles was to be signed by the German delegation, they were ushered in only to sign, then escorted back out through side doors. Colonel Edward House, Wilson's top advisor, said the treatment of the German delegates was "not unlike what was done in olden times when the conqueror dragged the conquered at his chariot wheels.'"
President Woodrow Wilson wanted peace to be based around his Fourteen Points, an idealistic set of treaty statements he had introduced to Germany when they had asked for terms for an armistice. He said he would introduce the Fourteen Points to the Allies and fight for their acceptance. In return, Germany was to depose its leaders and promise to vacate occupied France and Belgium. Wilson was to discover how the Europeans conducted war and peace. Very little of his Fourteen Points would emerge unscathed from the Conference.
One of the greatest obstacles to a fair treaty was the number of secret treaties among the Allied countries made primarily to secure loyalties. Many of these treaties were exposed by Leon Trotsky of Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. In the Treaty of London made in 1915, Italy was promised huge regions in Austria-Hungary and parts of Dalmatia on the coast. Czarist Russia and France had agreed to support each other's claims to portions of Germany's land when German boundaries were to be decided after the war. Some nations eyed the vast Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and thought about how to carve up the land. Japan was promised German possessions in the northern Pacific Ocean and in China's Shantung Province. In return, they were to help to escort vessels in and out of the Mediterranean. Wilson would not consider a peace treaty which gave in to these prior secret agreements.
European members of the Allied Powers were not happy with the role the United States was taking in the Peace Conference considering America waited three years before entering the war. Perhaps this helped in weakening much of Wilson's Fourteen Points.
Some of the Fourteen Points were determined by the European Allies to be uncomfortable or unreasonable. Poland was to have access to the sea. The problem with this was the land which would lead to access to the sea was inhabited by Germans. Self-determination, one of the biggest concepts to come from the Fourteen Points, was disagreeable to the British; they were still dealing with the Irish population of the British Isles and home rule. The British were upset that the Fourteen Points meant if a future conflict arose, they could not set up a naval blockade. The French wanted to have the ability to make private diplomatic arrangements between themselves and nations with which they wished to be allies. Any treaty without massive reparation payments to be made by Germany would be refused by Great Britain and France.
Countries came to the table greedy for money and land. Each of the Allies owed sizable amounts of money to each other. John Maynard Keynes in his Essays in Persuasion about the Treaty of Versailles noted the United States had loaned about 1.9 billion dollars to its allies during World War I. No wonder these nations wanted the aggressors to pay so dearly.
So what did the Treaty of Versailles accomplish? France regained the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine she had lost in the Franco-Prussian war. Poland annexed most of West Prussia, Poznan, the Polish Corridor, and parts of Upper Silesia. Danzig (now Gdansk) became a free city. Belgium received Eupen and Malmedy. Denmark was given North Schleswig. France was to control the Saar Territory and the Allies the Rhineland for fifteen years. The colonies Germany had possessed became mandates under the League of Nations. The Rhine River's right bank was never to be militarized again. Germany could not produce major offensive weapons and was to reduce its army and navy to 100,000 troops apiece. The part of the treaty thought to cause the most hardship to Germany was the reparations payments, but these were ended after 1932.
Treaties are never fair to the defeated nation but neither did the Treaty of Versailles give to the victors as much as they had expected.
Resources:
h ttp://www.encycloped ia.com/doc/1E1-Versa illTr.html
Watt, Richard M. The Kings Depart: The Tragedy of Germany: Versailles and the German Revolution. Simon and Schuster: New York, 1968.
Keynes, John Maynard. Essays In Persuasion. W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1963.
Learn more about this author, Sandra Petersen.
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Whether viewed in the light of history, in the passion of 1919, or in the retribution of Nazi Germany a generation later, the Treaty of Versailles was not simply unfair - it would prove to be one of the most cataclysmic "mistakes" in diplomatic history. To even label it a "peace" treaty is stretching the bounds of credibility.
During the six months between Armistice Day and the final signing of the Treaty of Versailles, untold millions of women and children would perish - the young and the old - throughout Central Europe while the Allied Blockade remained in force, preventing food from reaching a starving populace that spread far beyond Germany. In the throes of this starvation and the great influenza epidemic, Bolshevik revolution spread from the Volga to the Elbe. Despite impassioned pleas from (of all people) British generals who could not stomach the site of starving children, American journalists, and countless others, the Allies held the blockade like a gun over the head of a broken Germany until she would submit to the terms of the Treaty. Nor did the representatives of Germany have input into the Treaty or even know of its exact terms until presented to them as an ultimatum. Should Germany not accept, the Allies would invade (and, in fact, did begin invading before the terms were finally signed at the last hour).
One of the greatest tragedies of the Treaty of Versailles is that - at least in the eyes of President Woodrow Wilson - it offered the hopes for a fresh new solution to the old ways of war. . .and held out the possibility of making this truly "A war to end all wars." Wilson's messianic dreams were rooted in his Fourteen Points, which included peace without victors or losers and self-determination of peoples. Sadly, the Treaty of Versailles, Woodrow Wilson, the Fourteen Points, and America's rejection of the peace reflect a long tradition of American naivety in foreign politics continuing to the present. "Woodrow Wilson thinks he is Jesus," said French Premier Georges Clemenceau unkindly. Perhaps Wilson was a new messiah, but when it came to practicalities he was a babe in the woods. . .the woods of a Europe he would never understand.
"There are old wrongs to be righted," Clemenceau commented. There were ancient hates, fears, the all too fresh memory of the millions butchered on the front, the landscape scarred, the demands of revenge. And while revolution marched across the eastern and central part of Europe, the blockade continued, millions died and with it the hope that the Fourteen Points had once beaconed. While post-war Europe simmered and suffered, America of The Jazz Age enjoyed an unbridled optimism. Not Wilson, not America, could grasp the turmoil and torments of this Europe.
The Blackmail of Versailles demanded German acceptance of a war guilt clause, stripped Germany of her richest industrial land, of Alsace and Lorraine, reduced her mighty army to a police corps of 100,000, and reduced her navy to little more than a coast guard. Already economically devastated, Germany faced a $15 billion reparation fee with absolutely no means or hope of repaying it. When presented with the ultimatum, Germany reacted as would the United States or any other sovereign nation who sees its sovereignty stripped away from her. The peace treaty proved to be but a shadow of the dreams contained in Wilson's Fourteen Points. Stumbling between pressure from France, from Britain, from apparent German obstinacy,Wilson retreated into the sanctity of his dreams, incredibly denying the reality of what the dreams had now become.
When Herbert Hoover, in Europe on an economic recovery mission, read the Peace Treaty draft, he wrote, ". . .hate and revenge ran through [it]." Secretary of State Lansing felt "The impression made by it is one of disappointment, regret, and of depression."
"We had such high hopes of this adventure," moaned Henry White, "we believed God called us and now at the end we are put to doing hell's dirtiest work, starving people, grabbing territory. . .It was not for this that our Americans died."
"If these are President Wilson's fourteen points, then America can go to hell," declared German General Erich von Ludendorff.
But with the gun pointed at her head and Allied armies on the march, Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles. German furor over the tainted treaty, would allow an obscure Austrian corporal to portray himself and his party as patriots simply intent on righting one of the greatest wrongs in diplomatic history.
Even in 1919, British and American (and of course German) observers fatalistically accepted that the peace treaty would mean another war to come. As tragic as the Great War was, its ending (which was no ending at all) was even more tragic.
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