Theory: Is Tabula rasa founded?

Yes

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by Orestes J. Gonzalez

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A brief examination into the underlying philosophical foundations of "tabula rasa"

The philosophical issue associated with the phrase "tabula rasa," namely, that "our intellect at birth is like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," is one of the fundamental teachings of the "philosophy of being."

The "philosophy of being" is the basic philosophical position initially elaborated in the IV century BC by Aristotle (384-322 BC), further developed in the XIII century by Aquinas (1225-1274), seriously studied in the XX century by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) and Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), and proposed anew by Pope John Paul II (1920-2005.)

The phrase "tabula rasa" is a translation of Aristotle's "pinakis agraphos," which literally means "unwritten tablet."

In this paper, I shall limit myself to stressing some points relevant to the grounding of the doctrine that the human intellect before it exercises its functions is "tamquam tabula rasa," like a clean tablet.

Common sense dictates that in our way of knowing a relation between intellect and external reality is established.

But the fact that we are able to reach external reality through the intellectual conception of it does not justify the conclusion that thoughts and intellectual conceptions were present in our minds prior to our interaction with reality. (1)

It actually makes more sense to think that the awakening of the intelligence coincides with the apprehension of the external things of nature.

Our question then "Is tabula rasa founded?" amounts to asking "What do we take to be the primary evidence?"

Should we take thought and intellectual conceptions to be primary, or rather choose the existence of the external things of nature to be prior?

One thing is clear at the outset: the moment one chooses thought and intellectual conceptions as the starting point, one can no longer conceive the intellect as "tabula rasa," one must somehow accommodate the existence of "innate knowledge" in the intellect prior to the intervention of any extrinsic source of knowledge.

The "philosophy of being" postulates that it is not the case that thought is prior to things.

The "philosophy of being" chooses the things of nature as the point of departure for philosophical reflection and therefore the conception of the intellect as being initially "tamquam tabula rasa" is grounded on the fact that the awakening of the intelligence coincides with the apprehension of things.

Aquinas, the principal exponent of the "philosophy of being," is plain and positive in saying that "One finds no truth in man if it were not because man grasps truth in the things of nature." (2)

By building on common sense and relying on the way things manifest themselves, the Aristotelian epistemology discovered that the intellectual faculty of man is equipped from its inception with the necessary means to perfectly exercise acts of intellection.

In the dynamism of these acts of intellection two components converge:

(a) Firstly, a component that comes directly from the internal, natural constitution of the intellectual faculty, a component which is subjectively different for each person. This component is not knowledge; it is simply the "empty" faculty with the capacity to exercise certain operations.

(b) Secondly, a component exterior to the faculty, namely, the intelligible content received from the extramental subsisting things of nature. This content is received through the senses and elevated to the intelligible order by what Aristotle called the internal "light of the active intellect."

This internal light is not "innate knowledge," nor is it a direct internal feeder of knowledge.

The internal "light of the active intellect" is that whereby the information transmitted through the senses is made intelligible in act.

For this to happen, besides the presence of the active intellect in the internal constitution of the faculty, the presence of extramental things is required. External things are the ones actually interacting with the senses and the ones we actually know as well with our intellect.

In other words, the human intellect cannot exercise its operations outside certain constraints. But the manner of knowing in man is not by means of "innate knowledge." In the beginning, before knowledge, the human intellect is "tamquam tabula rasa."

The influence of the Aristotelian "tabula rasa" on the unfolding of later developments in philosophy, theology, psychology, and science is monumental.

Indeed, the influence of the Aristotelian "tabula rasa" reaches even present day research in many fields, because "tabula rasa," the doctrine that "our intellect at birth is like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," is well founded.

Notes

(1) See Charles Dubray, "Knowledge," in "The Catholic Encyclopedia," New York, Robert Appleton Company, Retrieved 18 September 2008 from New Advent, http://www.newadvent .org/cathen/08673a.h tm.

(2) "Secundum quod accipitur veritas ex parte rei, homo de se non habet veritatem" ("In Epist. ad Rom," 3, 1.) In his written works Aquinas used the Latin noun 'Tabula' more than 300 times. Here is a sample from his treatise "De Veritate" (18, 7): "The human intellect, in the beginning, is like a 'tabula' on which nothing is written" (Intellectus humanus in sui principio est sicut 'tabula' in qua nihil est scriptum.)

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